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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah

ARCHIE BECKSTROM and
ELIZABETH BECKSTROM,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.

CASE
NO. 8646

ARTHUR LIVINGSTON and
DIANTHA LIVINGSTON,
Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In this case most of the facts are disputed, and the
evidence is conflicting.
The appellants contend that on or about December 30,
1947, the appellant, Arthur Livingston, entered into an oral
arrangement with the respondent, Archie Beckstrom, for
the possession and sale of part of appellant's property as
follows:
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367 head of ewe sheep at $20.00 per head ... $ 7,340.00
7 hea.d of buck sheep at $30.00 per head. . .
210.00
900 head desert gmzing permit at $2.50
per head . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,250.00
283 acres of land and water rights in Utah
County, Utah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8,000.00
Total purchase price .... $17,800.00
A credit of $1,600.00 on the purchase price was allowed
by appellant to respondent ($900.00 at the rate of $1.00
for each head of sheep permit and $700.00 for previously
feeding and herding of appellant's sheep by respondent for
estimated expenses to be incurred in drilling a water well
on the land sold and for the caring for the sheep then in
possession of respondent but belonging to appellant (Tr. 93
to 102, Exhibits D-13, D-14, D-15). As part of said oral
arrangement, respondent was to pay five per cent interest
per annum on the unpaid balance and respondent was to
continue to run appellants' sheep for him and to submit a
start:ement of the actual costs of the appellants' share of
the water well and herding expense. At the same time,
respondent owed appellant $100.00 for lambs sold to appellant (Tr. 46, 47, 94, 119, 157, Exhibit D-14, T. 76, 201).
Respondent paid $6,300.00 on the oral arrangement up to
June 1, 1949 (T. 194, E~hibit D-14). On or about June 1,
1949, tlhe parties entered into a written agreement which
states a purchase price of $10,000.00 for the foregoing described property including the same number of sheep. That
no settling of accounts was had between the parties and no
accounting of the charges and credits of $1,600.00 on the
water well and herding expense was attempted until October, 1953 (T. 71, 72, 119, 188, 195).
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Appellant also contends that he bought 97 head of
sheep in October and November of 1950, which sheep re...
spondent agreed to and did herd and run for appellant on
the ground and permits that respondent was purchasing
from appellant. The wool shorn from these sheep in the
Spring of 1951 was sold by appellant as his wool from his
sheep for $712.00 (T. 69, 70, 188, 189). Said 97 head olf
sheep were turned over to respondent pursuant to ~an agreement between the parties and appellant gave a credit to
respondent f.or $526.24 of the wool money on interest (T.
8 to 16, 64 to 68, EX!hihit P-2). Respondent paid in cash $9,481.25 on principal and interest on the contract between
June 1, 1949, and January 12, 1953 (T. 7). Appellant paid
certain taxes, assessments and grazing fees due against
the property being soJd and used by respondent and which
respondent was obligated and assumed to pay. Respondent
paid most of said taxes, assessments and grazing fees directly to the parties entttled thereto and repaid appellant
for some orf the same which appellant advru1ced, but appellant claims a credit for advancements not repaid and interest thereon as follows:
GeneTal taxes on }and sold for 1953 and 1954 .. $ 89.17
General taxes on 1and sold for 1955.......... 48.17
Strawberry water assessments for 1950. . . . . . . 68.71
Strawberry water assessments for 1951. . . . . . . 49.41
Bureau olf Land Management grazing fees for
respondent's share for 1951. . . . . . . . . . . . . 72.00
Bureau of Land Management grazing fees for
respondent's share for 1950............. 72.00
Taxes orf $187.50 paid by respondent for 1948
due under contract for property bought by
respondent burt credited as a contract payment less $87.02 on appellant's home tax 100.48
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(See Point III on appeal.)
The respondents tendered by letter of their attorney
dated October 15, 1953, the sum of $1,000.00, less $80.00
paid on appellant's 1949 home taxes, in final payment on
the amount due on the contract, (Exhibit D-4) which tender was not accepted by appellanlts as the same was substantially insufficient.
The U.S. Bureau of Land Management in 1953, prior
to the alleged tender, reappraised the nwnber of head of
sheep that could be grazed on the land being sold to respondents and reduced the same from 900 head to 700 head
while the respondents were in full use of said grazing permits and the permit for 700 head was issued in the name
of respondent Beckstrom (T. 19 to 20, 63 to 64, 111 to 117,
Ex:hibit D-17).
STATEMENT OF POINTS

POINT I
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING
THAT ON THE FIRST DAY OF JUNE, 1949, THERE
WAS DUE, OWING AND UNPAID TO THE APPELLANTS FROM THE RESPONDENTS THE SUM OF $10,000.00.
POINT II
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT IF PAYMENT HAD NOT BEEN MADE, THAT
THE CONTRACT O'F JUNE 1, 1949, WAS AN ACCORD
AND SATISFACTION OF THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT
BETWEEN THE PARTIES.
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POINT III
THAT APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO CREDIT
FOR THE AMOUNTS OF TAXES, GRAZING FEES AND
WATER ASSESSMENTS AND INSTALLMENTS PAID,
'J10GETHIER WITH INTEREST THEREON AT THE
RATE OF TEN PER CENT PER ANNUM FROM THE
DATES PAID, WHICH AMOUNTS EXCEED THE SUM
OF $186.50 ALLOWED BY THE TRIAL COURT.
POINT IV
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT APPELLANTS SOLD WOOL AND RECEIVED
$714.16 THEREFOR AND AGREED THAT RESPONDENTS SHOULD HAVE CREDIT ON THE CONTRACT
IN THE AMOUNT OF $714.16.
POINT V
THAT THE BALANCE OF $1,381.14 OWING ON THE
CONTRACT AS OF MARCH 1, 1952, AS FOUND BY THE
TR[AL COURT IS ERRONEOUS AND THE TENDER
OF 1953 AND 1955 IS INSUFFICIENT, AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECREEING SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF SA]D CONTRACT AND ALLOWING RESPONDENTS THEIR ATTORNEYS FEES AND
COSTS, AND APPELLANTS ARE ENTITLED TO THEIR
ATIORNEYS FEES AND COSTS.
POINT VI
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING
THAT THE GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY IN CHARGE
OF DESERT PERMITS MADE A RE-APPRAISAL OF
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THE 1'-WMBER OF HEAD THAT COULD BE GRAZED
AND REDUCED THE SAME TO 835 HEAD AND THIAT
APPELLANTS SHOULD CONVEY 135 HEAD GRAZING
PERMIT TO THE RESPONDENTS.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING
THAT ON THE FIRST DAY OF JUNE, 1949, THERE
WAS DUE, OWING AND UNPAID TO THE APPELLANTS FROM THE RESPONDENTS THE SUM OF $10,000.00.
In the Complaint and Amended Complaint of respondents, a contract between the parties dated June 1, 1949,
for a purchase price in the sum of $10,000.00 is pleaded
and that $6,200.00 had been previously paid on said purchase price (R. 4, 26). In the Reply (R. 17), respondents
allege a written agreement for said sale about January 1,
1948, for $16,200.00. Said written memorandum (Exhib~t
D-19) states a total consideration of $16,200.00 for said
sale, though respondent admits (T. 23-25) that appellant
owed him at the same time certain accounts for herding
and hauling appellants' sheep and driving a water well on
the land being purchased, and that respondent verbally
agreed to pay at least four per cent interest from December 30, 1947, on said purchase price (T. 23). Appellant
contends that respondent agreed to pay five per cent interest thereon and that a credit was allowed of $1,600.00
in addition to the $16,200.00 for said unsettled accounts
on an original consideration of $17,800.00, wth the under-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7

standing that a statement of said charges would be submitted by respondent to appellant as soon as the figures
and shares thereof became available. (See Statement of
Facts for references). At least appellant was entitled to
proof (1953 Utah Code Annotated, Rule 9C) of the payment alleged and computation of the interest prior to June
1, 1949, but the record does not establish nor account how
a balance of $10,000.00 as of June 1, 1949, was reached
except for the naked statement of that figure in the written contract of that date. The fact of the $1,600.00 credit
is substantiated by notations made by appellant at the time
and the admission by respondent of the existence of accounts owing at the time. The agreement of appellant to
share the oost of the water well is grounded in the fact that
part of the agreement was that respondent continue to run
appellants' sheep as was done in 1950 and 1951, and none
of these accounts were ever settled (T. 27-28, 119-120).
The fact that the credit for the cost of the well and sheep
herding prior to 1949 was brought up in 1953 substantiates that there was no meeting of the minds when the contract of June 1, 1949, was signed (T. 188, 194-195). The
fact that the detailed expense claimed by respondent (T. 2443) and owing by appellant hadn't yet been figured by respondent according to his testimony from his deposition prior to the computation O!f $558.00 in 1953 (T. 71-73) and the
fact that the additional amount of $200.00 claimed and
charged for hauling sheep of appellant in 1947 was baseless
inasmuoh as the independent witness Lucero testified he
drove appellant's sheep to Strawberry in 1947 (T. 86-88),
both negate the claim that the accounts had been settled or
agreed before June 1, 1949, and further show thart there
had been no meeting of the minds of the parties. "Pay-
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ment" of the amounts due appellant before June 1, 1949,
has not been shown by respondent and the balance owing
with interest, yet still allowing full credit to respondent
for the whole $1,600.00, would be appro~tely $10,800,00
as of June 1, 1949.

It should be kept in mind that any amounts owing by
appellant to respondent for the well expenses and water
improvements and for herding and hauling sheep prior to
June 1, 1949, depend solely on the agreement of appellant
to pay respondent therefor, as respondent's theory holds
that these items were separate from the contract but were
offset and settled as a means of reaching the $10,000.00
figure in the contract of June 1, 1949. What respondent
is actually claiming is not payment at all, but that something other than payment was accepted in satisfaction
of or in lieu of payment or that something less than what
was due was agreed to satisfy the original obligation (T.
201-202). This amounts to an attempt to plead an accord
and satisfaction instead of "payment" which will be discussed in Point II. See Continental Gin Co. v Arnold, 153
Pac. 160 (Okla..). The evidence is uncontroverted that the
credit of $1600.00 for these items was never settled and
that appellant's agreement to pay for these items was never
met by resJX>ndent's accounting therefor and that the
amounts have always been disputed. If the parties could
make an agreement for $16,200.00 "total consideration"
with these items being owing, but unsettled and unpaid as
of December 30, 1947, with no provision to account for the
same, then it is just as possible that the parties could state
the figure of $10,000.00 consideration when they reduced
the agreement to writing on Jnne 1, 1949, still not providing for the settlement or accounting of these admitted
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items. The record is peculiarly silent as to any figures or
amounts of settlement on the charges made for the well
and improvements, sheep herding charges, interest, lamb
credit of $100.00 owing appellant, at the time the $10,000.00
figure was arrived at. Surely the respondent, with such a
good memory of facts, figures, values and dealings with
appellant in this record, could indicate the details of how
the $10,000.00 figure was arrived at, instead of making
the assertion that it was done and that is all he can recall
about it (T. 41). In fact, Mr. Beckstrom could not recall
even where this accounting with Mr. Livingston took place!
(T. 39).
POINT II
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT IF PAYlVJ.ENT HAD NOT BEEN MADE, THAT
THE CONTRACT OF JUNE 1, 1949, WAS AN ACCORD
AND SATISFACTION OF THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT
BETWEEN THE PARTIES.
While the Complaint and Amended Complaint claim
"payment," the Reply to Counterclai·m (R. 17) and motion of respondent (T. 88-89) daim that the written contract of June 1, 1949, constituted an accord and satisfaction between the parties.
"Accord and satisfaction" requires the party relying
thereon to prove the accord and satisfaction and requires
a meeting of the minds of the parties and a consideration,
while in this case neither factor is present. Also, the new
contract has not been performed by respondent according
to the terms thereof, and the accord and satisfaction has
thus failed and is of no force or effect. The respondent,
Mr. Beckstrom, has been delinquent in his payments as to
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time and amount, and he still owes, by his own admission,
about $1,000.00 on the contract (T. 190-191), though time
is of the essence of the agreement (T. 7, Exhibit D-15).
If the accord has failed, then the full amount of the original
obligation is due. A tender of performance of an accord,
executed in part only, is insufficient. (1 Am. Jur. 216-217,
240, 251-255, 260-261 on Accord and Satisfaction).
There is no evidence in the contract of June 1, 1949,
that a dispute was being settled or that the contract was
a compromise or a settlement. "Acceptance of the execution of the accord is the sine qua non of a plea of accord
and satisfaction". Continental Gin Company vs. Arnold,
153 Pac. 160 (Okla) . This case also criticizes the use of
the word "payment" as merely denominating in legal contemplation an attempt to plead "accord and satisfaction."
In the case at bar the difficulty seems to be that the appellant refuses to accept the executory accord and cannot
now be satisfied with a tender of performance. All the
cases hold that where a creditor agrees to accept a l~r
swn than is actually due him or where a new contract is
consistent with a continuance of a former one and only
provides a new method of discharging the former one, it
has no effect until it is performed. No new consideration
was paid to appellant for entering into the agreement of
June 1, 1949.
Ashton v. Skeen, 85 Utah 489, 39 Pac. 2nd 1073; Browning v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 72 Pac. 2nd 1060
(Utah) ; Smoot v. Checketts, 41 Utah 211, 125 Pac. 412,
Ann. Cas. 1915C, 1113; Williston on Contracts, 129.
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POINT III
THAT APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO CREDIT
FOR THE AMOUNTS OF TAXES, GRAZING FEES AND
WATER ASSESSMENTS AND INSTALLMENTS PAID,
'IDGETHER WITH INTEREST THEREON AT THE
RATE OF TEN PER CENT PER ANNUM FROM THE
DATES PAID, vVHICH AMOUNTS EXCEED THE SUM
OF $186.50 ALLOWED BY THE TRIAL COURT.
According to Ex:hibit D-15, the respondent buyer agreed
to pay all taxes and water assessments and forr desert permits of every kind and nature which are assessed or may
be assessed orr may become due on all of the real and personal p11operty described in the contract, and that the appellant seller upon default of any of said payments, may
pay the same and charge the said buyer therefor, together
with ten per ,cenrt interest from date of said payments. Pursuant to this agreement, respondent undertook and did pay
hereunder most of the annual payments of taxes, water
assessments and desert grazing fees, except the credits
claimed by appeUant in the Statement of Fact. The respondent always considered these matters as his obligation,
and when he did not pay the same directly to the parties
entitled thereto, he reimbursed appellant for most of said
charges after appellant paid the same. The water assessments included 1:Jhe so-called "construction charges" of the
Strawberry Water Users Association, and were so paid by
respondent and considered as water assessments until during the trial of this cause respondent discovered that perhaps he could charge appellant for construction charges
because of the statement orf the court, and afte'r the trial
respondent amended his Complaint to so charge (T. 52-61,
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189-190, R. 27, 47, Exhibits D-5, 7, 8). Appellant did pay
the delinquent assessment, including construction charges
for the years 1950 and 1951 which were not repaid by respondent and for which appellant claims a credit (T. 77-78,
108-109, Exhibit D-16). Respondent knew of the Strawberry Water appurtenant to the land and t.haJt its construction oharges are prorated over a period of years in the
nature of an annual assessment because water is wirfuheld
if not paid and the amount is largely offset by the power
and grazing dividends earned by the Association (T. 182,
Exhibits D-15, 20). Respondent, by his knowledge and
conduct, is estopped from claiming he is not obligated to
pay the water assessments of every kind and nature, which
include construction charges.
Exhibit D-17 shows the billings of the Bureau of Land
Management on all of the government grazing permits belonging to appellant, and includes payments by appellant
for the years 1950 and 1951 on the 900 head grazing permit used and being pw~chased by respondent. These payments by appellant \\rere made December 6, 1949, and ])e..
cember 29, 1950, both in the sum of $113.12, a year in advance as required by the BLM. The fee rate was eight
cents per head for the South Dugway Unit 900 head permit, which fee totals $72.00 for respondent's share of the
billing to be paid in 1949 and 1950 for the years 1950 and
1951, respectively. The evidence is nncontroverted that
appellant paid these fees and is entitled to a credit of $144.00
therefor; the fees to be paid in 1951 and 1952 in advance
for the years 1952 and 1953, respectively, were paid by respondent (T. 62-63, 113-117, 123, Exhibit D-17). Respond·
ent repaid appellant in 1948 and 1949 for the grazing per·
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mit for the years 1948 and 1949 (T. 52-53, 55, 58, Exhibits
D-7, 8).
Appellant gave credit on the oonrtract :f.ior $187.50 paid
by respondent November 28, 1949, on general taxes on the
land described in the conrtract and including $87.02 on appellant1S home rbaxes in Spanish Fork which was nort included in the contract of sale (T. 7, 58, 103). Under the
contract of sale, the respondent owed these taxes on the
land being purchased, so that $100.48 of the $187.50 should
not be credited on the c<mtmct and appellant is entitled to
a credit therefor (Exhibits D-15 and P-1).
Exhibit D-10 shows that the general taxes on the land
being sold herein were paid by appellant for the years 1953
and 1954 on the day they became delinquent (T. 61-62).
The taxes for 1955 were paid by appellant on the day before they became delinquent, and respondent claims he paid
the same an the last day (T. 106-107). Appellant is entitled
to a credit on the amormrts paid on taxes for the years 1953,
1954 and 1955, in the sum of $137.34.
The lower court awarded a credit of $186.50 to appellants on taxes, grazing and water assessments (R. 48), but
appellants are entitled to credits of the amounts paid thereon as set forth in the Statement of Fraots and based on the
evidence herein, together with infte,rest on said amounts
from the daJtes paid at the raJte of ten per cent per annum
as provided in the oontract.
POINT IV
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT APPELLANTS SOLD WOOL AND RECEIVED
$714.16 THEREFOR AND AGREED THAT RESPOND-
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ENTS SHOULD HAVE CREDIT ON THE CONTRACT
IN THE AMOUNT OF $714.16.
Another sore spot between the parties has been the
97 head of sheep bought by appellant in the fall of 1950
and turned over to respondent as his own sheep with the
increase after June, 1951 (T. 8-16, 64-76, 103-106). Mr.
Livingston took the wool which Mr. Beckstrom had sheared
from :these sheep and sold the same as his own wool (T.
129-133). Mr. Beckstrom admits that the sheep belonged
to Mr. Livingston, as did the wool (T. 189). At any rate,
the e~act nature of this sheep account had not been settled
by the parties until the trial of the case when appellant
withdrew his Cross-Complaint on the sheep account (R.
14-15, 20), and the payments of $1615.00 advanced by respondent were taken off as credit on the contract.
On or about February 19, 1952, appellant signed a
memerandum before respondent's attorney purporting to
give a credit of $526.24 on the wool money for interest on
the contract (Exhibit P-2). Not until the trial did respondent Beckstrom claim the difference between this amount
and what the wool actually was supposed to have sold for
(T. 13-14, 69-70). It should also be noted that appellant
stipulated $712.00 was received for the wool, and not $714.16
(T. 13-14, 129), and there is no other evidence as to total
receipt.
At best, the parties could be said_ to have settled this
sheep account when the statement on Exhibit P-2 was
signed in 1952 giving $526.24 credit for the wool on interest,
as the aotual inte-rest is about $150.00 more than the
$526.24, by computation. There is no evidence of an agreement to do otherwise with respect to a credit of the full
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amount of $712.00 received for the wool sold by appellant
from his sheep, except, of course, again, tlhe claim by respondent that he was to receive the wool money (T. 15).
Certainly it cannot be s~own that appellanrt agreed to any
such settlement. lVIr. Beckstrom still owed Mr. Livingston
money on the contract in 1952, and irt would have been jusrt
as easy to credit $712.00 on the oontracrt in Exhibit P-2 as
the $526.24, if that were the agreement and inrtention of the
parties. Apparently it is all right for Mr. Becksrtrom to
claim "selttlemoot" of former accounts by acclamation only
and a written figure (as with the $10,000.00 contract of
June 1, 1949), burt the same standard does not apply to a
"setJtlement" and written memorandum witJh lVIr. Livingston.
There was a genuine dispute on this sheep account,
and the written memoflandtun, questionable as it is, cannot
be expanded to imply something that wa:s never intended.
POINT V
THAT THE BALANCE OF $1,381.14 OvVING ON THE
CONTRACT AS OF MARCH 1, 1952, AS FOUND BY THE
TRIAL COURT IS ERRONEOUS AND THE TENDER
OF 1953 AND 1955 IS INSUFFICIENT, AND THJE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECREEING SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF SAID CONTRACT AND ALLOWING RESPONDENTS THEIR ATTORNEYS FEES AND
COSTS, AND APPELLANTS ARE ENTITLED TO THEIR
ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS.
Appellants contend that the amount of $1,381.14 found
owing on the contract as of March 1, 1952, is erroneous
for the reasons set for1Jh in this brief hereinabove. Apparently, the trial court allowed the full $714.16 on the wool
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apply against ~the computed balance owing and then found
thaJt respondents tendered (presumably October 15, 1953)
the full bal·ance owing, (R. 47-48), and then goes on to say
that "thereafter the defendants (appellants) became entitled to a credirt against plaintiffs (respondenrts) by reason
of paymenrt of taxes on the land described in the contract,
by reason of payment of desert permirt assessments for
sheep grazing privileges, and for payments made on Strawberry Water assessments in the sum total of $186.50, making a balance due to rthe defendants (appellants) of $902.27".
From the Statemenrt of Facts heTein and in Point III on
appeal irt: appeaTS that all tJhe credirts claimed by appellants
for taxes, grazing fees and water assessments accrued prior
to the darte of the tender in 1953, except the general taxes
totJalling $89.16 for the years 1953 and 1954. No explanation of how tJhe $186.50 is computed, or which items it
represents, is given, nor whetJher ten per cent interest or
any interest was allowed as required by the contract of
June 1, 1949. The payments on water assessments and on
desert grazing privileges for the year in advance had to
be made so that respondents would be able to use the water and grazing (Exhibits D-17, 20). Surely tJhe appellants
are entitled to credit for these principal amounts of $262.12
fior water and grazing assessments for 1950 and 1951 and
paid prior to rthe date of the letter of tender of October 15,
1953. Appellants are entitled to the general taxes which
they paid of $89.16 for the years 1953 and 1954, plus ten
per cent interest thereon to be added to any final setJtlemenrt figure. Appellanrts are also entitled to interest on tJhe
total unpaid balance until the same is paid in full.
The filing of the Amended Complaint related the claim
for $3,080.85 damages for construction charges of the
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Strawberry Water right back tJO the beginning of the lawsuit and would have the effect of waiving the legal advantages of any tender made by the purchasers, BeckStrom.
The purchasers, reSJpOndernts, changed their position and
their 'theory of the lawsuit by filing for damages (R. 26-32).
This amended claim relates back to the date of the original
Complaint according to Rule 15C of 1Jhe Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Respondents cannot daim damages and a
$3,080.85 credit, so obviously an afterthought, and maintain at the same time they have paid the contract balance
and tendered the agreed amount due on the written agreement (T. 189-190, R. 27). This relief contended for by the
respondents was not gvanted beoause of the conduct of respondents in paying on these construction charges and
knowing that the parties under their contract contemplated
the buyers assuming the same as water assessments as described in •the contract (See Point III on appeal). The position of respondents on ·tih:i:s matter is another indication
that there never was a meeting of the minds of the parties
when the contract of June 1, 1949, was drawn.
Time was made the essence of the written agreement
of June 1, 1949, and the payments were tJO be made strictly
within the times provided, though they were not paid as
agreed (T. 7, Exhibits P-1, D-15). The last paymenJt under
the contract was to be paid by October 1, 1953, though ·the
tenders of purohasers were not made until afiteT October
15, 1953 (Exmbit D-4).
"If time is of the essence, no question of delay of laches,
using these words with regard to their true meaning,
can properly arise. If time is essential, the stipulation
of the eontraot must be exactly complied with; not the

delay, but the failure to perform at the

e~act

day, cuts
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off the righrt of defuulting party." (Pomeroy on Specific
Perrormance, Section 399.
"Time may be essential. It is so whenever the intention
01f the parties is clear that the performance of its terms
shall be accomplished exactly at the stipulated day.
The intention must then govern. A delay cannot be
e~cused. A perfonnance at the time is essential; any
default will defeat the right to a specific performance."
Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, Volume 4, Section
1408. See also Vo~ume 6, Section 1811. Opuses cited
in Roberts v. Braffett, 33 Utah Reports 51, 63-65.
Appellants have tendered back and do now tender to
respondents all monies paid under said oral and written
agreements by respondents and offered to cancel the said
contract (R. 14).
Inasmuch as 'the tenders herein from respondents have
been insufficient, or not in rtime, or waived by respondents,
or inasmuch as the contract should not be specifically enforced, the respondents are not entitled to attorneys fees
and costs against these appellants. Where respondents
were not allowed damages for a "construction charges" lien
on the property nor for cut-down of the grazing permit
while they were using the same, they are not entitled to
attorneys fees and costs for not getting the relief for which
they filed suit in enforcing the contract, as the appellants
have nort defaulted in any of the <.."'Ovenants and agreements
contained in the contract.
On the other hand, appellants are entitled to attorneys
fees ru1d costs for enforcing the contract provisions as to
the amounts due them unde·r the contract.
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POINT VI
THAT TilE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING
THAT THE GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY IN CHARGE
OF DESERT PERMITS MAJDE A RE-APPRAISAL OF
THE NUMBER OF HEAD THAT COULD BE GRAZED
AND REDUCED THE SAME TO 835 HEAD AND THAT
APPELLANTS SHOULD CONVEY 135 HEAD GRAZING
PERMIT TO THE RESPONDENTS.
The trial court found that before the tender of the balance due on the contract, the government had re-appraised
the number of head of sheep that 'Oould be carried by the
property and reduced the same to 835 head from 900 head,
and that the reduction was made while respondenrts were
using the peTrnit and that the reduction was made without
the fault of appellants. The record shows by Mr. Beckstrom's own testimony that the Bueau of Land Management
re-checked the commensurate carrying capacity of the property being sold under the oonrtract and that said B. L. M.
transferred 700 head to Mr. Beckstrom (T. 19-20). The
appellant, Mr. Livingston, in addition to the land being
sold under contract, owns 160 acres commensurate property in Sanpete County which is base for 135 units of sheep
permirt (T.111-114, Exhibit D-17). This land belonging to
the appellant would be made practically valueless if the
sheep pennit were transfe1rred away from the same to someone who had commensurate property to which the pern1i:t
could be atmached, but the transfer of grazing permit depends on the Bureau of Land Management and the permits
are strictly a license whioh may be raised or lowered or terminated by the government (T. 167-168). The permit as
shown on the last page of Exhibirt D-17 srtates, among other
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things, as follows: "This permit is subject to temporary
adjustment if the necessity arises to protect or conserve the
public lands affected."
The intention of the parties should be considered as a
whole as to the intention of the parties. The contraot was
an agreement to sell a sheep operation consisting of land,
water righrts and sheep grazing permits. It was intended
that this unit be sold, delivered and used as ra unit as was
aotually done unrtil1953 when a re-appraisement was made
of the carrying capacity of the property and the permit reduced from 900 head to 700 head. The appellants delivered
the use of rail of the grazing permits, consisting of 900 head,
on rthe property being sold to respondents, and the re-evaluatioo occurred during respolll!dents' use of said property
and permits. The buyer received the constructive permit
for 900 head grazing privileges, as was contemplated under
the contract, and any change depended upon the evaluation
of the government ragency. The land is still subject to governmental re-appmisal, and the number of head may be increased back to 900 head, depending on conditions of grazing useage, and depends on the water shed and specific
physical conditions. The buyer used 1lhe whole permit. for
900 head tmtil 1953, when the re-appraisal was made. The
appellants tmnsferred what they had and what they inten-.
ded to be sold, and have no control over re-appraisal by
the government agency. The 135 units owned on the Dugway permit are in addition to, separate from, and have
nothing to do With the original 900 head permit whidl was
delivered to and used by respo!Ildents (T. 111-112). It
would be inequitable to order appellants to transfer this
135 head merely because respondents happen to own additional base property to which the same nlighrt be attached,
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and thel['eby ruin the use and value of the other property
belonging to appellants.
"If the conditions have been substantially perlormed

and the benefit of the contract fully secured to the
opposite party, equity has oonsidm-ed iit sufficient. A
party ~who has done all that can reasooobly be e~c
ted of him to perform his part of an agreement will
be considered in equity as having performed it." 12
Am. Jur. 902-903, Contracts, Sec. 343.
"A contract which is legal in its inception but becomes
illegal by subsequent statutory enaotmem [or by subsequent lawful acts of public authority] is wholly terminated as soon as the staJtute takes efifect even though
the time specified for its perrfonnance has not yet fully
expired, and no action can be ~maintained by either
party for failure to perform the obligations of the contract after the illegality has aJttJcmhed." 12 Am. Jur.
955-956, Contracts, Sec. 379.
In reality, if appellants are ordered to transfer 135 head
grazing permit in addition to the grazing permirt ~or the
property being sold, respondents will receive more than was
intended or ~agreed upon under the original contract. If
respondents are dissatisfied wirth what has happened, the
appellants are perfectly willing 1Jo oonsider the contract at
an end 'as set forth by the above authorities, and hereby
tender re-payment of the monies received in return for the
possession of the property in its present condition. By insisting on 1Jhe additional sheep permit, respondents show
that they are trying to obtain samertfuing to which they are
not enti1:lled, with no regard f!or the rights of appellants and
1Jhe original intenrtion of the parties. Tlliis disagreement
again shows tJhart there was no meeting of the minds on the
written conrtract provisions of June 1, 1949.
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CONCLUSION

It is readily apparent that the parties hereto have not
agreed on most of the issues in this case, and it is difficult
to find any evidence where there was any clear settlement
or positive agreement. Respondents have testified of such
agreements, but the record is absent of proof of positive
agreements or statements of accounting produced for appellants. Respondents claim that the adjustment credit
should be deducted from the original contract price of $16,200.00, and appellants claim that the adjustment credits
should be deducted from 1Jhe original contract price oif $17,800.00, wmch figure includes a $1,600.00 amount of credit
fur such purpose.
The appellants are entitled to the credits shown by the
evidence, including those for taxes, grazing fees and water
assessments paid fur the account of respondents and otherwise set fortJh in this brief, and that the Counterclaim of
appellants should be re-instated and the relief given as
prayed fior in said Counterclaim, including reasonable attorneys fees and costs incurred herein, and for such other
relief as to the Court may seem just and equitable.
Respectfully submitted,
DEAN W. PAYNE,
Attorney for Appellants
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